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e-mail : raiteri@mfn.unipmn.it, robertonai@libero.it
Abstract
The report presents the simulation of communication scenarios involving one area control centre and
a set of substations inside a distribution grid of the Electrical Power System. In such scenarios, the
communication is affected by threats different from those under exam in [1, 2]; in particular, here, we
consider the denial of service attack to the communication network, and the temporary internal failure of
a subset of substations. The scenarios have been modeled and simulated in form of Stochastic Activity
Networks (SAN); the goal is the evaluation of the impact of the threats, on the communication reliability.
Acronym list:
DoS Denial of Service
EPS Electrical Power System
FT Fault Tree
ICT Information Communication Technology
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
LAN Local Area Network
MCDTU Monitoring Control and Defense Terminal Unit
SAN Stochastic Activity Network
SPN Stochastic Petri Net
1 Introduction
This work was developed inside CRUTIAL project (CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL resilience) [3] investi-
gating the ways to obtain the resilience of the Electrical Power System (EPS); this means the capacity of the
EPS to provide its service despite of the occurrence of failures or attacks concerning devices, applications or
functionalities inside the system. Actually, in the EPS, an accidental failure or a malicious attack may affect
a subset of the EPS infrastructures; For instance, an attack to a communication network may affect the data
information or command exchange among the EPS sites connected by that network; as a consequence, such
attack may compromise an automation function depending on such data, such as the teleoperation or the
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voltage regulation [4, 5]. This may cause physical damages to the infrastructures or compromise the electric
power supply.
The EPS can be structured in three subsystems, each composed by a physical and an ICT infrastructure:
• the Power generation consists of the set of plants generating the electric power;
• the Transmission grid is the set of high voltage electric lines, substations and control centres necessary
to transport the electric power from the power plants to the distribution grid of each region of the
territory;
• the Distribution grid is the set of medium or low voltage electric lines, substations and control centres
in charge of transporting the electric power to the consumers located in the region.
One of the activities in CRUTIAL is the evaluation of critical scenarios. Such a scenario consists of a
particular event sequences occurring in a certain portion of the EPS (scenario domain), as a consequence of
an attack or a failure. Each scenario is characterized by the occurrence of a particular kind of these threats.
One of the ways to evaluate the scenarios is the simulation of stochastic models representing the events in
the scenarios; the goal is estimating the effects of attacks or failures, on the scenario domain.
The critical scenarios of interest in the project are defined in [5] and take place in different domains.
In particular, several scenarios deal with the communication between the sites of the EPS (control centres,
substations, plants, etc.). The communication can be compromised by attacks or failures affecting the sites
or the communication networks. In [1, 2], we evaluated communication scenarios involving a control centre
and a set of substations located in a distribution grid; in [1, 2], the scenarios are characterized by intrusions
and communication network failures. In this report instead, the scenarios have the same domain (Sec. 2),
but they are characterized by denial of service (DoS) attacks affecting the communication network, and the
failures of the substation components (Sec. 3). The scenarios are modeled (Sec. 5) and simulated (Sec. 6) in
form of Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) [6], by means of the Mo¨bius tool [7, 8]; the goal is estimating the
communication reliability in terms of probability and quantity of failures in the communication.
2 The scenarios domain
The scenarios under exam [5] take place in a domain composed by one control centre, a set of 10 substations,
and two communication networks, inside a distribution grid of the EPS. Typically a substation is connected
to several electrical lines for the electrical power transportation, and executes the commands coming from
the control centre. Such commands usually concern some operations to be performed on the electrical lines.
In the case of the distribution grid, the same command may be sent to all the substations. For instance, a
command is an arming or disarming order [5]. The generation of a command by the control centre occurs as a
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Figure 1: The scheme of the domain and the threats.
consequence of another command coming from the transmission grid, or as a consequence of the state of the
distribution grid described by the signals coming from the substations. Such signals are sent periodically and
describe the state of the substations or the state of the electrical lines connected to them. Such information
allow the control centre to monitor the state of the portion of the distribution grid under its control. So, the
communication of commands and signals has to be reliable in order to avoid malfunctioning in the distribution
grid.
2.1 Command and signal sessions
In our domain, we suppose that each command generated by the control centre has to be executed by all
the substations; therefore, a copy of the command is sent to each substation. Moreover, we assume that
the execution of a command by a substation is notified to the control centre by the transmission of an
acknowledgment coming from the substation. So, the generation, the transmission and the execution of a
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command are performed according to the following sequence of operations that we call “command session”:
1. the control centre opens the command session: it generates the command and starts collecting the
acknowledgments coming from the substations and concerning the command execution, until a certain
time out expires;
2. a copy of the command is transmitted on the available communication network to each substation;
3. each substation executes the command and generates an acknowledgment proving the execution of the
command;
4. each acknowledgment is transmitted on the available communication network to the control centre;
5. the time out for the acknowledgments collection expires and the command session is closed.
In the case study investigated in this report, we suppose that signals are not sent by a substation in an
autonomous way, but we assume that they are generated as a reply to a poll request: periodically the control
centre polls all the substations by sending a poll request to each of them, and they reply by sending a signal to
the control centre. The protocol for the communication of signals is similar to the case of the communication
of commands: we call “signal session” the following sequence of operations:
1. the control centre opens the signals session: it generates a poll and starts collecting signals coming from
the substations, until a certain time out expires;
2. a poll request is transmitted on the available communication network to each substation;
3. each substation generates the signal;
4. each signal is transmitted on the available communication network to the control centre;
5. the time out for the signals collection expires and the signal session is closed.
We assume that that at most one command (signal) session is running at any time. In the domain under
study, the time for an event to occur can be deterministic or random; in the second case, such time is ruled
by the negative exponential distribution whose rate is the inverse value of the mean time for the event to
occur. The occurrence (mean) times for the events in a command or signal session are reported in Tab. 1.
2.2 The transmission of packets
In our domain, the transmission of the several kinds of packets (command copies, acknowledgments, poll
requests and signals) is performed by means of the redundant communication networks NET1 and NET2.
NET1 is usually used for the communication between the control centre and the substations. We suppose
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Event Type of event (mean) time to occur occurring rate
command generation stochastic 6.00000E+00 h 0.16667 h−1
command execution stochastic 2.77778E-04 h 3600 h−1
time out for ack. deterministic 5.55556E-03 h -
poll generation deterministic 8.33333E-02 h -
signal generation stochastic 2.77778E-04 h 3600 h−1
time out for signals deterministic 5.55556E-03 h -
packet transmission stochastic 2.77778E-04 h 3600 h−1
Table 1: The (mean) occurrence time (and the corresponding rates) for the events in a command or signal
session.
that the bandwidth of each communication network is equal to 16 kbit/sec and that the transmission of each
packet consumes 1 kbit/sec of the bandwidth. This means that no more than 16 packets can be transmitted
on the same communication network at the same time. It may happen that the current available bandwidth
of NET1 is not enough to transmit all the packets. For instance, if a command session and a signal session
are running in parallel way, it may happen that 10 acknowledgments and 10 signals have to be transmitted
to the control centre at the same time. In this case, 16 of such packets will be transmitted by NET1, while
the remaining 4 packets will be directed to NET2 for the transmission.
Actually, we could have specified that the transmission of a packet requires less than 1 kbit/sec of the
bandwidth, or that a communication network has a bandwidth higher than 16 kbit/sec; in this way, the
communication network would be able to transmit more than 16 packets at the same time. Our choice depends
on the fact that one of the goals of the scenarios is evaluating the effect of the bandwidth consumption to the
communication reliability. To this aim, if the communication networks had an higher transmission capacity,
then we would need to consider more than 10 substations in the case study, eventually making the simulation
computational costs worse.
3 The scenarios definition
In absence of attacks or failures, the communication between the control centre and the substations can not
fail. In case of threats instead, some packets (command copies, acknowledgments, poll requests, signals) may
be lost. If the number of substations is N , we consider a command (signal) session as successful if at least
N − 1 acknowledgments (signals) are received by the control centre before that the time out expires (N = 10
in the domain under study). If instead, more than one acknowledgment (signal) is missing when the time out
expires, then the command (signal) session is considered to be failed.
As mentioned in Sec. 1, each scenario is characterized by the occurrence of a particular kind of attack or
failure, and in this report we are interested in evaluating the domain described so far, in three scenarios:
• Scenario 1: the DoS attacks may occur;
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• Scenario 2: the substations failures may occur;
• Scenario 3: both the substations failures and the DoS attacks may occur.
Such scenarios are different from those in [1, 2] where the threats under exam are the intrusion in the
communication with the generation of fake commands, and the temporary unavailability of the communication
network.
3.1 The DoS attack
During a DoS attack, the attacker sends a huge amount of packets on the affected communication network:
the effect is the gradual reduction of the bandwidth available for normal communication, leading to the
complete unavailability of the bandwidth. We assume that a DoS attack may affect NET1 or NET2; both
communication networks may be attacked several times, but a communication network can not be the object
of more than one attack at the same time. It may happen that both networks are under attack at the same
time, but in this case, two distinct attacks are running and each affects one communication network.
NET1 and NET2 are redundant; so, in case of NET1 under attack, its bandwidth is gradually consumed
by the packets transmitted by the attacker; therefore also NET2 has to be exploited to transmit. If the global
available bandwidth of both NET1 and NET2 is not enough to transmit all the packets (command copies,
acknowledgments, poll requests or signals), then some of them will not be transmitted becoming lost.
We assume that a DoS attack affecting a certain communication network, occurs every month on average,
and that its mean duration is 12 h. Moreover, we suppose that mean time to completely consume the
bandwidth of NET1 is 3 h: since the bandwidth of NET1 and NET2 is 16 kbit/sec respectively, then the
bandwidth occupancy by the DoS attack is increased by 1 kbit/sec every 675 sec. (Tab. 2). When the DoS
attack ends, the bandwidth consumed by the attack becomes available again for the normal communication.
Event mean time to occur occurring rate
DoS occurrence 720 h 0.00139 h−1
DoS duration 12 h 0.08333 h−1
Bandwidth reduction by 1 kbit/sec. 0.1875 h 5.33333 h−1
Table 2: The mean occurrence time and the corresponding rates about the events in the DoS attack.
3.2 The substation failure
We assume that a substation is composed by three subsystems (Fig. 1):
• the MCDTU is the core of the substation and consists of a particular device in charge of managing the
requests for command execution or for signal generation coming from the control centre. The MCDTU
is connected to both the substation LAN and to the substation bay.
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• The LAN acts as a bridge between the MCDTU and the external communication networks NET1 and
NET2: all the packets transferred from the external communication networks to the LAN, then to the
MCDTU (commands and polls), or in the opposite sense (acknowledgments and signals), are directed
by a router and are filtered by a firewall. Actually the substation LAN could host workstations as well,
but their presence is not essential to the communication scenarios considered in this report, so we avoid
to consider them.
• The bay contains all the electrical devices necessary to physically perform the commands received by
the MCDTU, and to generate the signals to be delivered to the control centre. We assume that the
bay contains three redundant IED components connected to the MCDTU by means of two redundant
electrical buses: the MCDTU controls the IEDs ordering them the execution of the commands or the
retrieval of signals.
Figure 2: The Fault Tree model of the substation failure mode.
Component MTTF Failure Rate MTTR Repair Rate
bus 4380 h 2.28311E-4 h−1 24 h 4.16667E-2 h−1
IED 4380 h 2.28311E-4 h−1 48 h 2.08333E-2 h−1
MCDTU 8760 h 1.14155E-4 h−1 12 h 8.33333E-2 h−1
router 17520 h 5.70776E-5 h−1 6 h 1.66667E-1 h−1
firewall 17520 h 5.70776E-5 h−1 6 h 1.66667E-1 h−1
Table 3: The mean time to failure (MTTF), the failure rate, the mean time to repair (MTTR) and the repair
rate of each substation component.
The failure mode of the substation can be displayed in form of Fault Tree (FT) [9] expressing by means of
Boolean gates (AND, OR) how combinations of component failure events can lead to the failure of subsystems
or of the whole system. According to the FT model in Fig. 2, the substation becomes unavailable (event
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SUBSTATION ) if at least one of the following events occurs: the bay fails (event BAY ), the substation LAN
fails (event LAN ), or the MCDTU fails (event MCDTU ). The failure of the bay (event BAY ) occurs if both
the bus B1 and the bus B2 are failed (event BUS SET ), or if all the IEDs are failed (event IED SET ).
While a substation is unavailable because of its internal failure, it can not execute commands or generate
signals. Anyway, we assume that all the substation components are repairable, so the failure state of the
substation is temporary and the substation can be available again, when the repair of failed components is
completed. We suppose that each repair action concerns a single component. The mean time to failure, the
mean time to repair and the corresponding rates are reported in Tab. 3.
Actually in our report, we do not resort to the Fault Tree Analysis [9] in the scenarios evaluation. The
FT model is exploited only as a graphical representation of the failure mode of the substation, and in Sec. 4,
it will be converted into the SAN model representing both the failure and the repair mode of the substation.
4 Basic notions on SAN
SAN can be considered as a particular form of Petri Net; so, a SAN model contains places, activities (transi-
tions) and arcs. A place graphically appears as a circle, and contains a certain number of tokens (marking).
A particular condition on the marking of a certain set of places enables the completion (firing) of activities
(transitions) whose effect is modifying in some way the marking of the places. Activities graphically appear
as vertical bars.
An instantaneous activity completes (fires) as soon as it is enabled; a timed activity instead, completes
after a certain amount of time. In the detailed description of the SAN models of the scenarios (Appendix A),
we call “stochastic activity” a timed activity whose time to complete is a random, while we call “deterministic
activity” a timed activity whose time to complete is deterministic. The condition enabling the completion
of an activity can be expressed by connecting the activity to the places by means of oriented arcs, as it is
possible in SPN. The effect of the activity completion on the places can be specified in the same way. Another
way to express the condition enabling a certain activity consists of using input gates, graphically appearing as
red triangles. An input gate is connected to an activity and to a set of places; the input gate is characterized
by two expressions:
• a predicate consists of a Boolean condition expressed in terms of the marking of the places connected
to the gate; if such condition holds, then the activity connected to the gate is enabled to complete.
• a function expresses the effect of the activity completion on the marking of the places connected to the
gate.
Besides input gates, a SAN model can contain output gates as well; they appear as black triangles. An
output gate has to be connected to a certain activity and to a set of standard or extended places. The role of
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an output gate is specifying only the effect of the activity completion on the marking of the places connected
to the output gate. Therefore, an output gate is characterized only by a function.
In a SAN model, it is possible to set several completion cases for an activity; each case corresponds to a
certain effect of the completion and has a certain probability: when the activity completes, one of the cases
happens. A case graphically appears as a small circle close to the activity; from the case an arc is directed
to an output gate or a place.
The Replicate/Join formalism [7] was conceived for SAN models; such formalism allows to express by
means of a tree structure, the way to compose together several SAN models in a unique large composed
model. In the tree structure, leaf nodes are atomic SAN models, each non leaf node is a Join or Replicate
operator, and the root node is the model resulting from the composition of atomic models according to the
operators in the tree. In particular, the Join operator compose two or more SAN models by superposition
over their common places; the Replicate operator constructs a model consisting of a number of identical
copies of a certain SAN model (copies may share common places).
4.1 Motivating the use of SAN
We have chosen SAN as modeling formalism because it inherits the modeling power of Petri Nets and intro-
duces some advantages. As Petri Net based formalisms in general, SAN allows to express the system states
and behavior in terms of places containing tokens, and transitions modifying their quantity. So, the system
dynamics is represented by the token game, avoiding the modeler to consider the complete state space of the
system. This is useful in particular when the system behavior is characterized by the occurrence of concurrent
events.
SAN inherits the features of Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) [10] in particular, where the time to fire of a
transition can be a random variable. The Mo¨bius tool manages several kinds of probability distributions to
be associated with the transitions firing times, and deterministic firing times are available as well. This is
a reason why SAN is suitable to model the scenarios under exam in this report, where both stochastic and
deterministic events occur. Another advantage of SAN is the presence of a particular modeling primitive
called gate which allows to express in C code the condition enabling the firing of a transition, or the effect
of the firing on the places. In this way, it is possible to set complex firing conditions or effects that would be
very complicated (or impossible) to express in a Petri Net only by means of arcs. This allows to simplify the
graph structure of the model when we represent complex systems.
Moreover, Mo¨bius allows to build models by replicating and joining submodels, by means of a graphical
composition model. In this way, the modeler can concentrate its attention on each particular aspect of the
system behavior and represent it in form of SAN; then, the SAN models can be easily composed in order to
obtain the model of the whole system. Actually composition mechanisms are available also for Generalized
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Figure 3: The SAN model “Control Centre Functions”.
SPN [10], but they require the manual definition of scripts containing the composition operations. This is
less intuitive and rapid if compared with the graphical compositional framework in Mo¨bius.
5 The SAN models of the scenarios
In our modeling approach, we first model in form of SAN each aspect of the domain in isolation. Then, the
SAN models are replicated and joined to obtain the model of the whole domain. Actually several places are
shared by the SAN models and they act as points of connection when the models are composed. The model
of a scenario is obtained by representing the threat characterizing the scenario in form of SAN, and joining it
with the model of the domain, still by superposition over the common places. For the sake of brevity, in this
section we briefly describe the SAN models of the domain aspects and of the threats, while all their details
can be found in Appendix A.
In the domain under study, the functions of the control centre are the generation of commands and the
collection of acknowledgments in the command sessions, and the generation of polls and the collection of
signals in the signal sessions (Sec. 2.1). Such functions are represented by the SAN model appearing in Fig. 3
where the upper part concerns the control centre functions during the command sessions while the lower part
represents the functions in the signal sessions. The functions performed by a substation are modeled in the
SAN model in Fig. 4: the upper part of the model is about the execution of commands, while the lower part
of the model concerns the generation of signals.
The transmission of packets can be performed by the communication network NET1 or by NET2; packets
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Figure 4: The SAN model “Substation Functions”.
Figure 5: The SAN model “Packets Transmission”.
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Figure 6: The composed model of the domain.
can be command copies, acknowledgments, poll requests or signals. The SAN model in Fig. 5 represents this
situation. The markings of several places in this model represent packets waiting to be transmitted on the
available communication network: the tokens inside the places com queue and poll queue represent command
copies and poll requests respectively, and they appear also in the SAN model of the control centre (Fig. 3);
the tokens inside the places ack queue and sig queue represent acknowledgments and signals respectively, and
they appear also in the SAN model of the substation functions in Fig. 4. Other places in the SAN model in
Fig. 5 represent instead packets that have been delivered: the markings of the places ack and sig represent
the acknowledgments and the signals respectively, delivered to the control centre; such places appear in the
SAN model of the control centre (Fig. 3) as well. The tokens inside the places com and poll represent the
command copies and the poll requests respectively, delivered to the substations; therefore these places belong
also to the SAN model of the substation functions (Fig. 4).
Besides representing the packets transmission, the SAN model in Fig. 5 acts as a “bridge” to join the
previous SAN models in order to build the model of the whole domain. This is done in Fig. 6 where the SAN
model of the substation is replicated 10 times by means of the Rep operator (Sec. 4), in order to represent the
presence of 10 substations in the domain (Sec. 2.1). The result of the replication and the SAN model of the
control centre (Fig. 3) are joined with the SAN model of the packets transmission (Fig. 5), by superposing
the common places mentioned above. This is done by means of the Join operator (Sec. 4) and generates the
model of the domain.
The Scenario 1 is characterized by the occurrence of DoS attacks (Sec. 3) gradually reducing the available
bandwidth of the communication network NET1 or NET2 (Sec. 3.1). The DoS attack is modeled by the SAN
in Fig. 7; it contains the place dos out modeling the occupancy of the bandwidth by the packets transmitted
by the DoS attack. Since this may affect NET1 or NET2, two instances of the DoS attack model are
composed with the model of the domain in order to obtain the model of the Scenario 1 (Fig. 8). One instance
represent the DoS attack to NET1, so its place dos out corresponds to the place dos out 1 in the SAN model
of the packets transmission (Fig. 5). The other instance concerns the attack to NET2; therefore its place
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Figure 7: The SAN model “DoS attack”.
Figure 8: The composed model of the Scenario 1.
dos out corresponds to the place dos out 2 of the packets transmission model. In this way, the model in
Fig. 5 takes into account the bandwidth consumption also by means of the DoS packets, and acts as a bridge
also to include the DoS attack in the scenario model.
In the Scenario 2, the communication may be compromised by the unavailability of the substations
(Sec. 3), caused by the failure of their internal components (Sec. 3.2). The SAN model in Fig. 9 represents
the failure and the repair of the substation components; such model consists of the conversion into SAN, of
the FT model in Fig. 2, with the addition of the repair actions, each involving a single component of the
substation. In particular, this SAN model contains the place substation ko indicating if the substation is
currently unavailable or not. The composed model of the Scenario 2 in Fig. 10 is derived from the domain
model (Fig. 2) in this way: before the replication, the SAN model of the substation functions (Fig. 4) is
joined with the SAN model of the substation failure and repair (Fig. 9), by superposition over the common
place substation ko. In this way, in the resulting model of the substation, its functions are disabled if such
place is marked (the substation is unavailable). Then, such model is replicated in order to represent the set
of 10 substations in the domain.
Finally, the Scenario 3 takes into account both the DoS attacks and the substations failures. So, the its
composed model (Fig. 11) is obtained from the model of the domain by including two instances of the DoS
attack SAN model, and the SAN model of the substation failure and repair. Such models are joined with
those of the domain aspects in the same ways as in the case of the Scenarios 1 and 2 respectively.
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Figure 9: The SAN model “Substation Failure and Repair”.
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Figure 10: The composed model of the Scenario 2.
Figure 11: The composed model of the Scenario 3.
6 The scenarios simulation
For each scenario model described in the previous section, 10000 simulation batches have been performed by
means of Mo¨bius, setting a confidence level of 0.95, and a relative confidence interval of 0.1. The measures
computed by the simulation are:
• Prcom(t): the probability that at least one command session has failed at a certain time;
• Prsig(t): the probability that at least one signal session has failed at a certain time;
• Numcom(t): mean number of failed command sessions at a certain time;
• Numsig(t): mean number of failed signal sessions at a certain time.
The functions expressing such measures in terms of place markings are reported in Appendix B. All measures
are computed for a mission time varying between 0 and 10000 h. The values of Prcom(t) returned by the
simulation in each scenario are reported in Tab. 4 and are depicted in Fig. 12.a. Tab. 4 and Fig. 12.b show
the results obtained for Prsig(t) in each scenario.
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Figure 12: a) Prcom(t) (Tab. 4). b) Prsig(t) (Tab. 4).
Prcom(t) Prsig(t)
time Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
1000 h 3,850E-02 1,530E-02 7,770E-02 5,310E-02 3,750E-02 1,201E-01
2000 h 7,720E-02 3,230E-02 1,571E-01 1,037E-01 7,750E-02 2,397E-01
3000 h 1,159E-01 4,890E-02 2,280E-01 1,524E-01 1,152E-01 3,420E-01
4000 h 1,469E-01 6,400E-02 2,944E-01 1,994E-01 1,529E-01 4,292E-01
5000 h 1,799E-01 8,000E-02 3,559E-01 2,474E-01 1,854E-01 5,070E-01
6000 h 2,111E-01 9,390E-02 4,089E-01 2,898E-01 2,178E-01 5,732E-01
7000 h 2,418E-01 1,101E-01 4,608E-01 3,287E-01 2,499E-01 6,326E-01
8000 h 2,727E-01 1,260E-01 5,050E-01 3,670E-01 2,783E-01 6,829E-01
9000 h 3,010E-01 1,430E-01 5,451E-01 4,003E-01 3,072E-01 7,273E-01
10000 h 3,283E-01 1,596E-01 5,853E-01 4,327E-01 3,371E-01 7,655E-01
Table 4: Prcom(t) (Fig. 12.a) and Prsig(t) (Fig. 12.b).
Both Fig. 12.a and Fig. 12.b show that according to the event occurrence times specified in Sec. 2 and the
SAN models described in Sec. 5, the DoS attacks (Scenario 1) determine an higher probability of command
or signal session failure, with respect to the substation failures (Scenario 2). In the Scenario 1, if only one
communication network is under attack, its bandwidth is gradually reduced, while the bandwidth of the other
network is completely available for normal communication. In this situation, the global bandwidth of both
networks is enough to transmit the packets concerning a single session. Some packets may be lost instead,
if a command session is running in parallel with a signal session; in this case, both networks are necessary
to transmit all the packets, as described in Sec. 2.2: the residual available bandwidth of the network under
attack may not be enough to transmit all the packets that exceeds the bandwidth of the other network.
This will determine the failure of command sessions because command copies or acknowledgments are not
delivered, or the failure of signal sessions because poll requests or signals are not delivered.
Still in the Scenario 1, if both communication networks are under attack at the same time, a session
may fail also if it is not running in parallel with another one. This happens because the residual available
bandwidths of both networks may not be enough to transmit all the packets. In the Scenario 2 instead, a
command or signal session fails if at least two substations are unavailable at the same time due to internal
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Figure 13: a) Numcom(t) (Tab. 5). b) Numsig(t) (Tab. 5). During 10000 h the mean number of command
sessions is about 1665, the number of signal session is about 112500.
Numcom(t) Numsig(t)
time Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
1000 h 5,500E-02 3,130E-02 1,8390E-01 2,172E+00 1,942E+00 1,080E+01
2000 h 1,130E-01 5,980E-02 4,1050E-01 4,453E+00 3,931E+00 2,468E+01
3000 h 1,731E-01 9,000E-02 6,2860E-01 6,800E+00 6,049E+00 3,793E+01
4000 h 2,280E-01 1,163E-01 8,4240E-01 9,004E+00 8,044E+00 5,113E+01
5000 h 2,836E-01 1,452E-01 1,0619E+00 1,140E+01 1,033E+01 6,379E+01
6000 h 3,406E-01 1,705E-01 1,2724E+00 1,368E+01 1,216E+01 7,610E+01
7000 h 3,980E-01 2,015E-01 1,4863E+00 1,607E+01 1,434E+01 8,911E+01
8000 h 4,643E-01 2,341E-01 1,6925E+00 1,872E+01 1,641E+01 1,020E+02
9000 h 5,209E-01 2,712E-01 1,9121E+00 2,112E+01 1,876E+01 1,150E+02
10000 h 5,767E-01 3,057E-01 2,1284E+00 2,339E+01 2,116E+01 1,281E+02
Table 5: Numcom(t) (Fig. 13.a) and Numsig(t) (Fig. 13.b).
failures. Since a substation in failure condition does not reply to commands and polls, in this situation, at
least 2 acknowledgments or 2 signals will be missing when the command (signal) session is closed, determining
the session failure (Sec. 3).
The fact that DoS attacks affect the communication reliability more than the substations unavailabilities
is confirmed in terms of number of failed sessions, by the results obtained for the measures Numcom(t) (Tab. 5
and Fig. 13.a) and Numsig(t) (Tab. 5 and Fig. 13.b).
In the Scenario 3, a command or a signal session can fail due to a DoS attack, to the substations failure,
or to both causes. For instance, a command session may fail because one acknowledgment is missing because
a failed substation has not executed the command, and another acknowledgment is missing because the
communication networks are under DoS attack and the acknowledgment becomes lost. Actually, observing
Fig. 12.a and Fig. 12.b, we can notice that the values of both Prcom(t) and Prsig(t) in the Scenario 3 are
about the sum of the same probabilities in the Scenario 1 and in the Scenario 2.
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7 Conclusions
The report examined the communication between the control centre and the substations of a distribution grid
of the EPS. Scenarios characterized by the occurrences of DoS attacks and substations failures, have been
evaluated: we have obtained that the first type of threat has a higher negative influence on the communication
reliability. This evaluation has been performed by modeling and simulating the domain and the scenarios
in form of SAN. The use of this formalism allowed to model both the stochastic and the deterministic
events realizing the communication both in normal conditions and in presence of threats. Besides this,
the SAN formalism and the Mo¨bius tool in particular, allowed to build the models of the scenarios, by
composition of several submodels representing particular aspects of the domain or of the threats. Scenarios
in the same domain, but characterized by other threats (intrusions in the communication and unavailability
of the communication network), are evaluated in [1, 2].
Acknowledgments. This work has been partially supported by the EU-Project CRUTIAL IST-2004-
27513.
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A The SAN models in details
This appendix provides all the details about the SAN models in Sec. 5, each representing a particular aspect
of the domain or the threats involved in the scenarios.
A.1 Modeling the command and signal sessions
In this section, we first consider the models about the command sessions and the signal sessions (see Sec. 2.1).
They involve the control centre functions (generation of commands and polls, collection of acknowledgments
and signals), the transmission of packets (commands copies, acknowledgments, poll requests, signals) by the
communication networksNET1 andNET2, and the substation functions (execution of commands, generation
of acknowledgments, generation of signals).
A.1.1 Modeling the control centre functions
The functions of the control centre are the generation of commands and the collection of acknowledgments, or
the generation of polls and the collection of signals. Such functions are represented by the SAN model called
“Control Centre Functions” and appearing in Fig. 3 where the upper part of the model concerns the command
session (command generation and the acknowledgments collection): the stochastic activity called com gener
models the generation of a command; the effect of its firing (defined inside the input gate I com gener) is
opening the command session by marking the place com session open with one token. Moreover, such activity
marks both the place com queue and the place pending com with 10 tokens (10 substations are present in
the case study).
The generated command has to be sent to all the substations: each token inside the place com queue
represents a copy of the command to be transmitted to a particular substation. The tokens inside the place
com queue are consumed by an activity in the SAN model called “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5, where
such place is present as well. The SAN model in Fig. 5 represents the transmission of packets (commands,
acknowledgments, polls, signals), as described in Sec. A.1.3.
After the generation of a command, the control centre collects the acknowledgments about the command
execution, coming from the substations. The marking of the place pending com corresponds to the number of
command copies for which the acknowledgment has not arrived yet: the marking of the place ack corresponds
to the incoming acknowledgments during a command session; such place is marked by an activity in the
SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5). As soon as a token appears in the place ack, the activity
new ack removes the token from both the place ack and the place pending com, according to the output gate
O new ack. In this way, we model that the control centre is aware that the command has been executed by
one of the substations.
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The expiration of the time out for the acknowledgments collection is represented by the deterministic
activity ack time out enabled by the marking of the place com session open (input gate I ack time out): the
effect of its firing is verifying that enough acknowledgments have arrived to the control centre when the
time out expires; if the place pending com contains more than one token (more than one acknowledgment is
missing), then the command session is considered as failed and the marking of the place com session failed is
increased by one. Such place counts the number of failed command sessions. After such verification, the same
activity closes the command session by removing the token inside the place com session open, as defined in
the input gate I ack time out.
We suppose that at most one command session is running at a certain time, so parallel command sessions
are not possible: the input gate I com gener allows the firing of the activity com gener only when the place
com session open is not marked (the previous session has been closed).
The lower part of the SAN model “Control Centre Functions” in Fig. 3 is specular to the upper part,
but it represents the signal sessions (the generation of polls and the collection of signals). The generation
of a poll is modeled by the deterministic activity poll gener opening the signal session by marking the place
sig session open with one token. The same activity marks both the place poll queue and the place pending poll
with 10 tokens, where 10 is the number of substations. Such effect of the activity poll gener is specified in
the input gate I poll gener. The poll has to be transmitted to all the substations, so the tokens inside the
place poll queue represents the poll requests to be sent to the substations. Such place is present in the SAN
model “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5.
After the poll generation, the control centre collects the signals coming from the substations. The marking
of the place pending poll indicates the number of substations that still have to send the signal during the
signal session. The incoming signals are modeled by the tokens inside the place sig appearing in the SAN
model “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5 as well. As soon as a token appears in sig, the activity new sig
fires removing the token from both the place sig and the place pending poll, according to the output gate
O new sig. In this way, we model that the control centre has received the signal coming from one of the
substations.
The expiration of the time out for the signals collection is represented by the firing of the deterministic
activity sig time out enabled by the marking of the place sig session open, as specified in its input gate
I sig time out. When this activity fires, it verifies that the place pending poll does not contain more than
one token. If so, the signal session has failed (more than one signal is missing), and the activity sig time out
increases by one the marking of the place sig session failed counting the number of failed signal sessions.
This is specified in the input gate I sig time out.
We suppose that parallel signal sessions are not possible: the input gate I poll gener allows the activity
poll gener to fire only when the place sig session open is empty (the previous session has been closed).
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Tab. 6 shows the firing times and the input or output gates associated with each activity in the SAN
model “Control Centre Functions” in Fig. 3.
A.1.2 Modeling the substation functions
The functions performed by a substation are modeled in the SAN model called “Substation Functions” and
appearing in Fig. 4. The upper part of the model is about the execution of commands. The place com
contains the command copies received by the substations. Such place appears also in the SAN model “Pack-
ets Transmission” (Fig. 5). By means of the immediate activity get com ruled by the input gate I get com,
one token is moved from the place com into the place ack req and into the place current com. In this way, we
model that the substation is ready to execute one of the command copies (marking of the place ack req), and
that no other commands will be executed during the same command session by the same substation (marking
of the place current com). The execution of the command and the generation of the acknowledgment are
modeled by the stochastic activity com exec moving the token from the place ack req to the place ack queue
representing the presence of acknowledgments to be transmitted to the control centre. The place ack queue
is present also in the model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5).
The lower part of the model “Substation Functions” in Fig. 4 concerns the generation of signals by the
substation. The marking of the place poll represents the poll requests received by the substations. Such
place appears also in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5. By means of the immediate activity
get poll ruled by the input gate I get poll, one token is moved from the place poll into both the place sig req
and the place current poll. In this way, we model that the substation is ready to generate a signal as a reply
to a poll request (marking of the place sig req), and that no other signals will be generated during the session
by the same substation (marking of the place current poll). The generation of the signal is modeled by the
stochastic activity sig gener moving the token from sig req into the place sig queue representing the signals to
be transmitted to the control centre. The place sig queue appears in the SAN model “Packets Transmission”
in Fig. 5 as well.
The functions of the substation (execution of commands and generation of signals) can not be performed
if the substation is currently failed. The failed state of the substation is modeled by the presence of one token
inside the place substation ko which is present also in the SAN model called “Substation Failure and Repair”
in Fig. 9 considering the failure and repair of the substation. If the place substation ko becomes marked (see
Sec. A.3), then both the immediate activities get com and get poll are disabled, while both the immediate
activities discard com and discard poll are enabled according to the predicate defined in the input gates
I discard com and I discard poll respectively. In this situation, one token in the place com or in the place
poll is consumed if they are marked, but no acknowledgments or signals are generated. In this way, we model
that in case of substation failure, though a command copy or a poll request is received by the substation,
23
Activity: com gener
type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 6 h
firing rate: 1.66667E-01 h−1
input gate: I com gener
input gate predicate: (com session open->Mark()==0) && (Alert->Mark() > 0)
input gate function: com session open->Mark()=1;
pending com->Mark()=10;
com queue->Mark()=10;
Activity: new ack
type: immediate
output gate: O new ack
output gate function: if (pending com->Mark() > 0)
pending com->Mark()–;
Activity: ack time out
type: deterministic
time to fire: 5.55556E-03 h
input gate: I ack time out
input gate predicate: com session open->Mark()==1
input gate function: com session open->Mark()=0;
if (pending com->Mark() > 1)
com session failed->Mark()++;
Activity: poll gener
type: deterministic
time to fire: 8.33333E-02 h
input gate: I poll gener
input gate predicate: (sig session open->Mark()==0) && (Alert->Mark() > 0)
input gate function: sig session open->Mark()=1;
pending poll->Mark()=10;
poll queue->Mark()=10;
Activity: new sig
type: immediate
output gate: O new sig
output gate function: if (pending poll->Mark() > 0)
pending poll->Mark()–;
Activity: sig time out
type: deterministic
input gate: I ack time out
input gate predicate: sig session open->Mark()==1
output gate function: sig session open->Mark()=0;
if (pending poll->Mark() > 1)
sig session failed->Mark()++;
Table 6: The activities in the SAN model “Control Centre Functions” (Fig. 3).
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Activity: get com
type: immediate
input gate: I get com
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==0 && current com->Mark()==0 && com->Mark()>0
input gate function: current com->Mark()=1;
com->Mark()–;
Activity: com exec
type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 2.77778E-04 h
firing rate: 3600 h−1
Activity: discard com
type: immediate
input gate: I discard com
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==1 && current com->Mark()==0 && com->Mark()>0
input gate function: current com->Mark()=1;
com->Mark()–;
Activity: no com
type: immediate
input gate: I no com
input gate predicate: com session open->Mark()==0
Activity: get poll
type: immediate
input gate: I get poll
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==0 && current poll->Mark()==0 && poll->Mark()>0
input gate function: current poll->Mark()=1;
poll->Mark()–;
Activity: sig gener
type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 2.77778E-04 h
firing rate: 3600 h−1
Activity: discard poll
type: immediate
input gate: I discard poll
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==1 && current poll->Mark()==0 && poll->Mark()>0
input gate function: current poll->Mark()=1;
poll->Mark()–;
Activity: no poll
type: immediate
input gate: I no poll
input gate predicate: sig session open->Mark()==0
Table 7: The activities in the SAN model “Substation Functions” (Fig. 4).
there is no reply by the substation.
Tab. 7 summarizes the activities inside the model “Substation Functions” in Fig. 4, including the predi-
cates and the functions of the gates ruling the firing of the activities.
A.1.3 Modeling the packets transmission
The transmission of packets can be performed by the communication network NET1 or by NET2; packets
can be command copies, acknowledgments, poll requests or signals. The SAN model “Packets Transmission”
in Fig. 5 represents this situation. The markings of the several places in this model represent packets
waiting to be transmitted on the available communication network: the place com queue and the place
poll queue concern command copies and poll requests respectively, and they appear also in the SAN model
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“Control Centre Functions” in Fig. 3. The place ack queue and the place sig queue concern acknowledgments
and signals respectively, and they appear also in the SAN model “Substation Functions” in Fig. 4.
We suppose that the bandwidth of each communication network is equal to 16 kbit/sec and that the
transmission of each packet requires to consume 1 kbit/sec of the bandwidth (Sec. 2.2). This means that
no more than 16 packets can be transmitted on the same communication network at the same time. The
marking of the places com out 1, poll out 1, ack out 1, sig out 1 and dos out 1 represent the number of
command copies, poll requests, acknowledgments, signals and DoS packets (see Sec. A.2) respectively that
are currently under transmission by NET1. When a token appears in com queue, the immediate activity
send com fires removing the token, and the output gate O send com checks if the sum of the markings of
com out 1, poll out 1, ack out 1, sig out 1 and dos out 1 is less than 16 (16kbit/sec is the bandwidth of
NET1). If so, enough bandwidth is available to transmit the command copies, and the marking of the place
com out 1 will be increased by one. If instead the sum of the markings is equal to 16, then no bandwidth
is currently available on NET1 (this may happen in case of DoS attack (see Sec. A.2)): the output gate
O send com will check if the sum of the markings of com out 2, poll out 2, ack out 2, sig out 2 and dos out 2
is less than 16, in order to verify if some bandwidth is available on the communication network NET2. If
so, the marking of com out 2 will be increased by one. If no bandwidth is available on both NET1 and
NET2, the command copy will not be transmitted (it becomes lost). The presence of acknowledgments,
polls and signals to be transmitted, is modeled by the marking of the places poll queue, ack queue, sig queue
respectively. The direction of suck kinds of packets toward NET1 or NET2 is modeled in a way similar
to the command copies direction: the output gates O send poll, O send ack, O send sig perform the same
checks and have the same effect of O send com, in case of firing of the activities send poll, send ack, send sig
respectively, due to the presence of a token inside the places poll queue, ack queue, sig queue respectively.
The transmission of the packets by NET1 is modeled by the stochastic activity transmit 1 whose firing
is ruled by the input gate I transmit 1 having the following effect:
• any token inside com out 1 is moved into the place com which represents the command copies received
by the substations; com is the same place present in the SAN model “Substation Functions” (Fig. 4).
• Any token inside poll out 1 is moved into the place poll which represents the poll requests received by
the substations; poll is the same place present in the SAN model “Substation Functions” (Fig. 4).
• Any token inside ack out 1 is moved into the place ack which represents the acknowledgments received
by the control centre; ack is the same place present in the SAN model “Control Centre Functions”
(Fig. 3).
• Any token inside sig out 1 is moved into the place sig which represents the signals received by the
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Activity: send com
type: immediate
output gate: O send com
output gate predicate: if (com out 1->Mark() + poll out 1->Mark() + ack out 1->Mark() +
sig out 1->Mark() + dos out 1->Mark() < 16)
com out 1->Mark()++;
else
if (com out 2->Mark() + poll out 2->Mark() + ack out 2->Mark() +
sig out 2->Mark() + dos out 2->Mark() < 16)
com out 2->Mark()++;
Activity: send poll
type: immediate
output gate: O send poll
output gate predicate: if (com out 1->Mark() + poll out 1->Mark() + ack out 1->Mark() +
sig out 1->Mark() + dos out 1->Mark() < 16)
poll out 1->Mark()++;
else
if (com out 2->Mark() + poll out 2->Mark() + ack out 2->Mark() +
sig out 2->Mark() + dos out 2->Mark() < 16)
poll out 2->Mark()++;
Activity: send ack
type: immediate
output gate: O send ack
output gate predicate: if (com out 1->Mark() + poll out 1->Mark() + ack out 1->Mark() +
sig out 1->Mark() + dos out 1->Mark() < 16)
ack out 1->Mark()++;
else
if (com out 2->Mark() + poll out 2->Mark() + ack out 2->Mark() +
sig out 2->Mark() + dos out 2->Mark() < 16)
ack out 2->Mark()++;
Activity: send sig
type: immediate
output gate: O send sig
output gate predicate: if (com out 1->Mark() + poll out 1->Mark() + ack out 1->Mark() +
sig out 1->Mark() + dos out 1->Mark() < 16)
sig out 1->Mark()++;
else
if (com out 2->Mark() + poll out 2->Mark() + ack out 2->Mark() +
sig out 2->Mark() + dos out 2->Mark() < 16)
sig out 2->Mark()++;
Table 8: The activities in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5).
control centre; sig is the same place present in the SAN model “Control Centre Functions” (Fig. 3).
The transmission of packets byNET2 is modeled in a similar way by the stochastic activity transmit 2 and the
input gate I transmit 2 having effect on the places com out 2 and com (transmission of command copies),
poll out 2 and poll (transmission of poll requests), ack out 2 and ack (transmission of acknowledgments),
sig out 2 and sig (transmission of signals).
The activities present in the model “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5, together with the corresponding
input or output gates, are detailed in Tab. 8 and in Tab. 9.
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Activity: transmit 1
type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 2.77778E-04 h
firing rate: 3600 h−1
input gate: I transmit 1
input gate predicate: (com out 1->Mark() > 0) || (poll out 1->Mark() > 0) ||
(ack out 1->Mark() > 0) || (sig out 1->Mark() > 0)
input gate function: if (com out 1->Mark() > 0) {
com->Mark() = com->Mark() + com out 1->Mark();
com out 1->Mark() = 0; }
if (poll out 1->Mark() > 0) {
poll->Mark() = poll->Mark() + poll out 1->Mark();
poll out 1->Mark() = 0; }
if (ack out 1->Mark() > 0) {
ack->Mark() = ack->Mark() + ack out 1->Mark();
ack out 1->Mark() = 0; }
if (sig out 1->Mark() > 0) {
sig->Mark() = sig->Mark() + sig out 1->Mark();
sig out 1->Mark() = 0; }
Activity: transmit 2
type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 2.77778E-04 h
firing rate: 3600 h−1
input gate: I transmit 2
input gate predicate: (com out 2->Mark() > 0) || (poll out 2->Mark() > 0) ||
(ack out 2->Mark() > 0) || (sig out 2->Mark() > 0)
input gate function: if (com out 2->Mark() > 0) {
com->Mark() = com->Mark() + com out 2->Mark();
com out 2->Mark() = 0; }
if (poll out 2->Mark() > 0) {
poll->Mark() = poll->Mark() + poll out 2->Mark();
poll out 2->Mark() = 0; }
if (ack out 2->Mark() > 0) {
ack->Mark() = ack->Mark() + ack out 2->Mark();
ack out 2->Mark() = 0; }
if (sig out 2->Mark() > 0) {
sig->Mark() = sig->Mark() + sig out 2->Mark();
sig out 2->Mark() = 0; }
Table 9: The activities in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5).
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Activity: dos begin
type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 720 h
firing rate: 1.38889E-03 h−1
Activity: dos end
type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 12 h
firing rate: 8.33333E-02 h−1
output gate: O dos end
output gate function: dos out->Mark()=0;
Activity: dos gener
type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 0.1875 h
firing rate: 5.33333 h−1
input gate: I dos gener
input gate predicate: (dos active->Mark() > 0) && (dos out->Mark() < 16)
input gate function: dos out->Mark()++;
Table 10: The activities in the SAN model “DoS attack” (Fig. 7).
A.2 Modeling the DoS attack
The DoS attack gradually reducing the available bandwidth of the communication network NET1 or NET2,
is modeled by the SAN called “DoS attack” in Fig. 7. In this model, when no attack is running, the place
dos idle contains one token. In this situation, the stochastic activity dos begin can fire moving the token
from dos idle into the place dos active. In this way, we model that an attack has begun. While the place
dos active is marked, the stochastic activity dos gener can fire several times, increasing the marking of the
place dos out by one, each time. Such place represents the bandwidth occupancy by the DoS packets, and
corresponds in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5) to the place dos out 1 (in case of DoS attack
to NET1) or to the place dos out 2 (in case of DoS attack to NET2). The marking of the place dos out
can not exceed 16 tokens, corresponding to the maximum bandwidth occupancy (input gate I dos gener).
The presence of tokens inside dos out may cause the direction of packets toward the communication network
NET1 or NET2 in the model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5) (see Sec. A.1.3).
The end of the attack is modeled by the stochastic activity dos end whose firing has a double effect:
moving the token inside the place dos active into the place dos idle, and removing any token inside the place
dos out (by the output gate O dos end). In this way, the bandwidth of NET1 or NET2, occupied during
the attack, becomes available again.
Tab. 10 reports the firing times, the gate predicates and functions concerning the activities in the SAN
model “DoS attack” in Fig. 7.
A.3 Modeling the substation failure and repair
In this section, we describe the SAN model “Substation Failure and Repair” (Fig. 9) representing the failure
and the repair of the substation components; such model consists of the conversion into SAN form of the FT
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model in Fig. 2, with the addition of the repair actions, each involving a single component of the substation.
Let us consider first the component IED1 (see Sec. 3.2): the place ied 1 ok is initially marked with one
token in order to model that the component IED1 is working. Such token can be moved into the place
ied 1 ko by the stochastic activity ied 1 fail ; in this way, we model the current failed state of the component
IED1. The repair of this component is modeled by the stochastic activity ied 1 repair moving the token
from the place ied 1 ko into the place ied 1 ok. The failure and the repair of all the other components of the
substation is modeled in a similar way.
The immediate activity ied set fail fires when the places ied 1 ko, ied 2 ko, ied 3 ko are all marked; the
effect of the firing is the presence of one token inside the place ied set ko and this means that all the IED
components are failed. The condition enabling ied set fail to fire, and the effect of its firing are defined in
the input gate I ied set fail. If at least one IED component is repaired, the immediate activity ied set repair
fires removing the token inside the place ied set ko, as specified in the input gate I ied set repair.
In a similar way, the place bus set ko becomes marked as a consequence of the firing of the immediate
activity bus set fail when both the place bus 1 ko and bus 2 ko are marked, according to the input gate
I bus set ko. The token inside bus set ko indicates that both buses are failed, and is removed by the immediate
activity bus set repair when at least one bus is repaired, according to the input gate I bus set repair.
The failure of the substation is modeled by the presence of one token inside the place substation ko.
This place becomes marked if the activity substation fail fires; this happens at least one of the following
conditions holds: the place bus set ko is marked (all the buses are currently failed); the place ied set ko is
marked (all the IEDs are currently failed); the place mcdtu ko is marked (the MCDTU is currently failed);
the place router ko is marked (the router is currently failed); the place firewall ko is marked (the firewall is
currently failed). This is specified in the input gate I substation fail. The substation turns available again
when the immediate activity substation repair fires and consequently the place substation ko becomes empty.
Such firing can occur when all the following conditions hold: the place bus set ko is empty (at least one
bus is currently working); the place ied set ko is empty (at least one IED is currently working); the place
mcdtu ko is empty (the MCDTU is currently working); the place router ko is empty (the router is currently
working); the place firewall ko is empty (the firewall is currently working). This is specified in the input gate
I substation repair.
The activities in the SAN model “Substation Failure and Repair” in Fig. 9 are detailed in Tab. 11 and in
Tab. 12.
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Activity: bus 1 fail Activity: bus 1 repair
type: stochastic type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 4380 h mean time to fire: 24 h
firing rate: 2.28311E-04 h−1 firing rate: 4.16667E-02 h−1
Activity: bus 2 fail Activity: bus 2 repair
type: stochastic type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 4380 h mean time to fire: 24 h
firing rate: 2.28311E-04 h−1 firing rate: 4.16667E-02 h−1
Activity: ied 1 fail Activity: bus 1 repair
type: stochastic type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 4380 h mean time to fire: 48 h
firing rate: 2.28311E-04 h−1 firing rate: 2.08333E-02 h−1
Activity: ied 2 fail Activity: bus 2 repair
type: stochastic type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 4380 h mean time to fire: 48 h
firing rate: 2.28311E-04 h−1 firing rate: 2.08333E-02 h−1
Activity: ied 3 fail Activity: bus 3 repair
type: stochastic type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 4380 h mean time to fire: 48 h
firing rate: 2.28311E-04 h−1 firing rate: 2.08333E-02 h−1
Activity: mcdtu fail Activity: mcdtu repair
type: stochastic type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 8760 h mean time to fire: 12 h
firing rate: 1.14155E-04 h−1 firing rate: 8.33333E-02 h−1
Activity: router fail Activity: router repair
type: stochastic type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 17520 h mean time to fire: 6 h
firing rate: 5.70776E-05 h−1 firing rate: 1.66667E-01 h−1
Activity: firewall fail Activity: firewall repair
type: stochastic type: stochastic
mean time to fire: 17520 h mean time to fire: 6 h
firing rate: 5.70776E-05 h−1 firing rate: 1.66667E-01 h−1
Table 11: The activities in the SAN model “Substation Failure and Repair” (Fig. 9).
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Activity: bus set fail
type: immediate
input gate: I bus set fail
input gate predicate: (bus 1 ko->Mark()==1) && (bus 2 ko->Mark()==1) &&
(bus set ko->Mark()==0)
input gate function: bus set ko->Mark()=1;
Activity: bus set repair
type: immediate
input gate: I bus set repair
input gate predicate: (bus 1 ok->Mark()==1) || (bus 2 ok->Mark()==1)
Activity: ied set fail
type: immediate
input gate: I ied set fail
input gate predicate: (ied 1 ko->Mark()==1) && (ied 2 ko->Mark()==1) &&
(ied 1 ko->Mark()==1) && (bus set ko->Mark()==0)
input gate function: ied set ko->Mark()=1;
Activity: ied set repair
type: immediate
input gate: I ied set repair
input gate predicate: (ied 1 ok->Mark()==1) || (ied 2 ok->Mark()==1) ||
(ied 3 ok->Mark()==1)
Activity: substation fail
type: immediate
input gate: I substation ko
input gate predicate: (substation ko->Mark() == 0) && (bus set ko->Mark()==1 ||
ied set ko->Mark()==1 || mcdtu ko->Mark()==1 ||
router ko->Mark()==1 || firewall ko->Mark()==1)
input gate function: substation ko->Mark() = 1;
Alert->Mark()++;
Activity: substation repair
type: immediate
input gate: I substation ok
input gate function: (bus set ko->Mark()==0) && (ied set ko->Mark()==0) &&
(mcdtu ko->Mark()==0) && (router ko->Mark()==0) &&
(firewall ko->Mark()==0)
Table 12: The activities in the SAN model “Substation Failure and Repair” (Fig. 9).
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B Measures and functions
In Sec. 6, we have reported the simulation results obtained for the following measures:
1. Prcom(t): the probability that at least one command session has failed at a certain time (Tab. 4 and
Fig. 12.a);
2. Prsig(t): the probability that at least one signal session has failed at a certain time (Tab. 4 and
Fig. 12.b);
3. Numcom(t): mean number of failed command sessions at a certain time (Tab. 5 and Fig. 13.a);
4. Numsig(t): mean number of failed signal sessions at a certain time (Tab. 5 and Fig. 13.b).
In this appendix, we provide the functions expressing such measures in terms of place markings:
1. The first measure, Prcom(t), is computed as the mean value over the 10000 simulation batches, of the
reward rew1 having the following expression:
if (Control_Centre_Activity->com_session_failed->Mark()>0)
rew1=1;
else
rew1=0;
This means that in each simulation batch and at a certain time, rew1 is equal to 1 if the place
com session failed contains at least one token, or it is equal to 0 if the same place is empty. The
place com session failed is present in the SAN model “Control Centre Functions” (Fig. 3) and it indi-
cates the number of failed command sessions. So, the mean value of rew1 at a certain time, over the
10000 simulation batches, provides the probability that at least one command session has failed at a
certain time.
2. The measure Prsig(t) is computed in a similar way: it is the mean value over the 10000 simulation
batches, of the reward rew2 whose expression follows:
if (Control_Centre_Activity->sig_session_failed->Mark()>0)
rew2=1;
else
rew2=0;
The place sig session failed is present in Fig. 3 and it indicates the number of failed signal sessions.
The mean value of rew2 as a function of the time, provides the value of Prsig(t).
3. The mean number of failed command sessions (Numcom(t)) is computed as the mean value over the
10000 simulation batches, of the reward rew3 whose expression is:
33
rew3=Control_Centre_Activity->com_session_failed->Mark();
This means that rew3 is equal to the marking of the place com session failed in the model “Con-
trol Centre Functions” (Fig. 3); therefore rew3 in a certain batch and at a certain time is equal to
the number of failed command sessions at that time. The mean value of rew3 at a certain time,
over the 10000 simulation batches, provides the mean value of failed command sessions at that time
(Numcom(t)).
4. The measure Numsig(t) is computed in a similar way: it corresponds to the mean value of the reward
rew4 equal to the marking of the place sig session failed in Fig. 3:
rew4=Control_Centre_Activity->sig_session_failed->Mark();
The value of rew4 in a certain batch and at a certain time provides the number of failed signal sessions.
The mean value of rew4 at a certain time, over the 10000 simulation batches, provides Numsig(t) at
the same time.
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